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Abstract
Potential Future Exposure (PFE) is a standard risk metric for man-
aging business unit counterparty credit risk but there is debate on how it
should be calculated. The debate has been whether to use one of many
historical (“physical”) measures (one per calibration setup), or one of
many risk-neutral measures (one per numeraire). However, we argue that
limits should be based on the bank’s own risk appetite provided that this
is consistent with regulatory backtesting and that whichever measure is
used it should behave (in a sense made precise) like a historical measure.
Backtesting is only required by regulators for banks with IMM approval
but we expect that similar methods are part of limit maintenance gener-
ally. We provide three methods for computing the bank price of risk from
readily available business unit data, i.e. business unit budgets (rate of re-
turn) and limits (e.g. exposure percentiles). Hence we define and propose
a Risk Appetite Measure, A, for PFE and suggest that this is uniquely
consistent with the bank’s Risk Appetite Framework as required by sound
governance.
1 Introduction
Potential Future Exposure (PFE) is a standard risk metric for managing busi-
ness unit counterparty credit risk (Canabarro and Duffie 2003; Pykhtin and
Zhu 2007) however there is debate on how it should be calculated (Stein 2013),
as well as regulatory constraints (BCBS-185 2010). Whilst backtesting is only
required by regulators for banks with IMM approval, we expect that similar
methods are part of limit maintenance generally. The debate has been whether
to use one of many historical measures (one per calibration setup), or one of
many risk-neutral measures (one per numeraire). However, we argue that for
PFE:
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• whatever measure is chosen it should behave (in a sense to be made precise)
like a historical measure;
• the risk appetite of the bank should be consistent with regulatory con-
straints;
• open risk should be viewed according to the risk appetite of the bank, i.e.
the bank’s price of risk.
Given these three constraints we identify a unique new measure, the Risk Ap-
petite Measure, RAM, or A for computing PFE. We demonstrate that this
measure can be computed simply from existing bank data and provide exam-
ples.
As in (Canabarro and Duffie 2003) we define PFE as a quantile q of future
exposure, that is, as a VaR measure. Since we are considering exposure as a
control metric this is floored at zero. It is possible that PFE as VaR may be
replaced by PFE as Expected Shortfall (ES) following (BCBS-265 2013; BCBS-
325 2015). Substituting ES for VaR makes no difference to the development
here as both VaR and ES can be backtested (Acerbi and Sze´kely 2014) which
is sufficient for our purposes.
Open risk, and hence limits, is a widespread feature of banking and one mo-
tivation for capital. Pricing open risk, i.e. warehoused risk, is starting to attract
attention in mathematical finance (Hull, Sokol, and White 2014; Kenyon and
Green 2015) and has a long history in portfolio construction (Markowitz 1952)
and investment evaluation (Sharpe 1964). Valuation adjustments on prices for
credit have a long history (Green 2015) but it is only recently that capital has
been incorporated (Green, Kenyon, and Dennis 2014). This paper adds to the
literature linking investment valuation and mathematical finance by proposing
that limits be computed under the bank’s risk appetite measure provided as
part of sound, and self-consistent, governance.
The contribution of this paper is to develop and propose a method of com-
puting PFE that is consistent with a bank’s Risk Appetite Framework (RAF)
(BCBS-328 2015; FSB 2013) using the Risk Appetite Measure A, defined here.
This method avoids the issues with P-measure PFE computation (choice of
calibration), and avoids issues with Q-measure PFE computation such as the
implicit choice of a price of risk of zero. This approach can be used whenever
there is open risk, both for pricing as well as for limits. Arguably, comput-
ing prices and limits for open positions under A is the unique method that is
consistent with the bank’s RAF.
2 Risk Appetite Measure, A
Here we consider each of the constraints in the introduction and show how this
leads to a unique definition of a unique Risk Appetite Measure, A, suitable for
PFE.
2.1 PFE behaviour under P
Consider the flow chart in Figure 1 for computing PFE where d is an element
of the set of simulation stopping dates D and there are n paths. The output of
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Figure 1: Flow chart for computation of PFE under one of many physical (aka
historical) measures. d is a simulation stopping date in the set of all simulation
stopping dates D. Each separate physical measure corresponds to a different
choice of calibration algorithm and selection method for calibration data. We
stress that there are many physical measures in practice because of the common,
and erroneous, practice of referring to “the” physical measure as though the true
future probabilities were available for PFE computation.
the procedure is a set of PFE numbers, PFE(q,d), corresponding to the chosen
exposure quantile q for each stopping date d.
The P procedure of Figure 1 can be characterized by either of the following
equivalent properties:
• Each PFE(q,d) computation is independent of all simulation paths up to
d
• Only portfolio simulation values at d are required for the computation of
PFE(q,d)
We call this property of PFE behaviour under P the Independence Property.
From the point of view of physical-measure simuation this also appear to be
common sense, only values at the time have any effect.
Now considering risk-neutral pricing we know from, for example FACT TWO
of (Brigo and Mercurio 2006) that the price of a payoff at T seen from t
Price of Payoff(T)t = E
B
t
 B(t) Payoff(T)
B(T)

is invariant under change of numeraire from B to any other valid numeraire.
Valid numeraires are non-zero, self-financing portfolios. Hence the probability
distribution of the payoff at T discounted back to t is also invariant under any
change of numeraire as we now prove.
Lemma 1. The discounted cumulative distribution function (CDF) of future
portfolio value is measure invariant, as is the discounted probability distribution
function (PDF) if it exists.
Proof. Consider dcdf(t, V ) the discounted CDF of portfolio value x(T ), (i.e.
gives probability of x(T ) being less than or equal to the constant V ):
dcdf(t, V ) := EBt
[
B(t)
I(V, x(T ))
B(T )
]
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Where
x(T ) is the portfolio value;
I(V, x(T )) is an indicator function that is 1 when V ≥ x(T ) but zero other-
wise.
Now E[I(V, x(T ))] is the CDF of x(T ), and the B(t)/B(T ) is the discount-
ing. Since dcdf(t) is invariant under change of B for any other numeraire, the
discounted CDF is measure invariant. Hence so is the discounted PDF (if it
exists, as PDFs do not have to).
This suggests a numeraire-independent definition of PFE as discounted PFE.
However, how can we compare P-measure PFE and discounted-PFE, i.e. how
do we discount P-measure PFE back to t? We can be almost sure that the
expected value of a P-bank account will not be worth the inverse of a zero-
coupon bond from t to T . (If we could be sure then the P-measure drift would
be the same as the Q-measure drift which cannot be guaranteed). Thus we
can see two methods to discount P-measure PFE and it is arguable which one
to use as both investments are available at t (bank account and zero coupon
T-maturity bond). Should we chose the investment that generates the highest
return? We know the calibration so this is available. This uncertainty is similar
to the uncertainty over the choice of numeraire for Q-measure PFE (just apart
from choices of calibration).
The measure-independent definition of risk-neutral PFE is discounted PFE
and this cannot be compared to P-measure PFE because discounting P-measure
PFE is ambiguous. That is, P-measure PFE is naturally in the future whereas
Q-measure PFE is naturally in the present (and discounted).
This is where we need the Independence Property that each PFE(q,d) com-
putation is independent of all simulation paths up to d. This selects a unique
method to inverse-discount Q-measure PFE from t (now) to T (future), that
is we must use the T-maturity zero coupon bond. This construction of future
Q-measure PFE is measure independent1. This construction is also consistent
with PFE computed using the T -Forward numeraire for each T . Thus we have
a Q-measure PFE that behaves in the same way as P-measure PFE, i.e. has the
Independence Property.
2.2 Consistency of Bank Risk Appetite and Regulatory
Constraints
We develop the following points here:
• a bank has a documented risk appetite which defines prices of different
risks;
• backtesting requirements on risk factor dynamics give limits on drifts
(etc.), that is, limits on the bank prices of risks;
• we can calculate the bank price of risk from the risk appetite for each busi-
ness unit using easily available information, i.e. its limits and its budget
(required rate of return).
1Some readers may object that this construction uses a value not at T , i.e. the start-time
values of T -maturity zero coupon bonds. However, these are in the same category as data used
in the P construction for calibration: observed data that is not model or simulation dependent
and only refers to time T .
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We suggest that:
• the bank price of risk should be consistent with its regulatory requirements
as expressed through backtesting limits on the price of risk;
and observe
• there is no finite risk appetite that is consistent with a zero price of risk,
i.e. with a risk-neutral-based PFE.
In the following section we will develop the Risk Appetite Measure, A, for PFE
that is consistent with the bank’s risk appetite (as constrained by regulatory
requirements).
2.2.1 Bank Risk Appetite
Banks take risks, for example lending money, for rewards, that is to make prof-
its. Banks are required by regulators to document their risk appetite with an
effective Risk Appetite Framework (RAF), and the RAF is a key element of
increased supervision endorsed by G20 leaders (FSB 2013). A Risk Appetite
Statement (RAS) is a key part of supervision (BCBS-328 2015). The BCBS and
the FSB use slightly different terminology but both see a risk appetite statement
as vital. Risk appetite is defined in (BCBS-328 2015) referencing (FSB 2013)
as:
The aggregate level and types of risk a bank is willing to assume, de-
cided in advance and within its risk capacity, to achieve its strategic
objectives and business plan.
Risk appetite is not a single figure, rather:
Risk appetite is generally expressed through both quantitative and
qualitative means and should consider extreme conditions, events,
and outcomes. In addition, risk appetite should reflect potential
impact on earnings, capital, and funding/liquidity.
Senior Supervisors Group, Observations on Developments in Risk
Appetite Frameworks and IT Infrastructure, December 23, 2010
Principle three of the key elements of FSB Principles for effective RAFs is a
statement of risk limits which are defined as
Quantitative measures based on forward looking assumptions that
allocate the financial institutions aggregate risk appetite statement
(e.g. measure of loss or negative events) to business lines, legal en-
tities as relevant, specific risk categories, concentrations, and as ap-
propriate, other levels.
Furthermore:
The elements of the RAF should be applied at the business line and
legal entity levels in a manner that is proportionate to the size of
the exposures, complexity and materiality of the risks.
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In practice every business unit has a PFE (or VaR or other) limit and a budget.
Budget is the word used for the profit over a fixed period, or rate or return
on investment (or equity, etc.) that a business unit is required to deliver. The
business unit limits and the business unit budget define the risk appetite of the
bank for the risk type that the business unit is engaged in. These number are
readily available within a bank and constantly monitored. Every business unit
head is acutely aware of their progress towards plan on budget and their limit
usage.
Now we need to link the price of risk with the risk appetite. First recall a
definition of the market price of risk following (Bjo¨rk 2004). Suppose that we
have a stock price process S(t) under a physical measure:
dS(t)/S(t) = µdt+ σdW
then the market price of risk mM is defined as:
mM :=
µ− r
σ
(1)
where r is the riskless rate. The price of risk gives the additional return required
by investors per unit of return volatility σ. Of course the return can only be
volatile when it is not hedged. Were the return to be hedged, i.e. riskless, then
the return is r, the riskless rate. Before going into details we give the intuition
between the interaction of the different measures and constraints in Figure 2 as
follows.
1. (Top Left) shows an axis of possible prices of risk, with zero marked and
labelled with the Q measure because a risk-neutral measure has a zero
price of risk by definition.
2. (Top Right) adds a probability distribution of P-measure prices of risk. A
maximum-likelihood calibration will, by definition, pick the price of risk
with the highest likelihood. This particular calibration shows the support
of the P-measure prices of risk including zero.
3. (Middle Left) considers a later P-measure calibration where the probability
distribution of P-measure prices of risk has shifted because the input data
for the calibration has shifted. In this example the support of the P-
measure prices of risk no longer includes zero.
4. (Middle Right) adds a range of possible prices of risk consistent with
regulatory backtesting. There will be a most likely price of risk from the
regulatory backtesting but there will also be an interval (generally, a set)
of prices of risk that cannot be ruled out at any given confidence level
(here given as 95%).
5. (Bottom Left) considers a later situation where the interval of prices of
risk that cannot be ruled out with 95% confidence no longer includes zero.
6. (Bottom Right) adds the price of risk consistent with the Bank Risk Ap-
petite measure A (see below for details on computation).
Figure 2 illustrates several potential issues with P, Q, and A prices of risk.
Firstly, there is no guarantee that a zero price of risk will be consistent with
6
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Figure 2: Interaction of P, Q, and A prices of risk. See text for details.
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a P-measure price of risk, even if it was previously. Secondly, even if a zero
price of risk is consistent with regulatory backtesting over one period there is
no guarantee that a zero price of risk will remain consistent as markets move.
Thirdly, if the Bank’s Risk Appetite is chosen without consideration of the
regulatory backtesting there is no guarantee that the Bank’s Risk Appetite will
be consistent with regulatory backtesting. If this were to occur the Bank might
wish to reconsider its risk appetite.
2.2.2 Limits from Backtesting
Basel III (BCBS-189 2011) and its European implementation (EU 2013b; EU
2013a) mandate sound backtesting for the internal model method (IMM) for
credit exposure. Principles for such backtesting are provided in (BCBS-185
2010) and expanded on in (Kenyon and Stamm 2012; Anfuso, Karyampas, and
Nawroth 2014). If a bank is not using internal models for credit exposure
for regulatory purposes, i.e. does not have regulatory approval to do so, then
the bank may or may not choose to follow such principles for other purposes
such as PFE. We would expect this to be part of limit maintenance generally.
However, in the reverse case where regulatory approval has been obtained, then
the Use Test element (BCBS-128 2006), paragraphs 49-54 states that the bank
should be consistent in the data used for day-to-day counterparty credit risk
management. Although backtesting is only required by regulators for banks
with IMM approval we expect similar methods to be part of limit maintenance
generally.
Backtesting will select P calibrations that pass at a desired confidence level:
assuming such exist, if not the bank will not be permitted to use the IMM
approach for regulatory purposes, but may still use it for other purposes. Hence
it is possible to adapt the backtesting machinery to provide a set, or interval,
or simulation parameters that pass at a given confidence level as in standard
statistical interval estimation, see Chapter 9 of (Casella and Berger 2002).
We suggest that whatever the bank chooses as its price of risk, this should
be consistent with historical backtesting. The regulatory Use Test may in fact
require this but there is no specific mention in any of the FAQs for Basel III.
2.2.3 Computing the Bank Price of Risk
Since a bank has a risk appetite it has already specified its prices of risk. Here
we demonstrate how to compute them from business unit limits and business
unit budget (i.e. rate of return on investment).
A bank can have different prices of risk for different business units and for
different types of risk. There is a vast literature on market prices for different
types of risk including early work by (Sharpe 1964; Stanton 1997; Bondarenko
2014), here we deal with computing bank prices of risk for use in PFE. We use
the same form as Equation 1 to compute the Bank price of risk mB , e.g.
mB =
(Business Unit Rate of Return on Investment)− r
σ⇒
where: r is riskless rate; σ⇒ is the implied volatility from the PFE (or VaR) limit
and required rate of return for the business unit (i.e. budget versus investment).
Economically profits can come from many sources, for example rent from a
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monopoly position, or risk taking. Here we consider only that part of profit
that comes from risk taking.
We will start by assuming different parametric forms for the distribution of
the rate of return of the business unit. After this will provide an extension that
requires only an empirical (non-parametric) distribution of the rate of return of
the business unit.
Normal relative returns Suppose the relative returns of the business unit
have a Normal(µrequired, σ) distribution. µrequired is the required rate of return
of the business unit, and the business unit limit L is expressed as a PFE(q) in
units of required relative rate of return. Now we have two unknowns and two
constraints so the unknowns are uniquely defined as:
σ⇒ =
µrequired(1− L)√
2 erfc−1(2q)
(2)
mB =
µrequired − r
σ⇒
(3)
erfc−1 is the inverse of the cumulative error function. Figure 3 shows implied
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Figure 3: Implied volatility of required rate of return given budget (required
rate or return) of 10% and quantile (PFE or VaR) limit using 95%. See text for
details.
volatility of required rate of return given budget (required rate or return) of 10%
and PFE (or VaR) limit using 95%. As in Equation 2 this implied volatility
is linear in the PFE (or VaR) limit expressed in terms of the business unit
budget (not percentile). Figure 4 shows implied bank price of risk given budget
(required rate or return) of 10% and PFE (or VaR) limit using 95% and 99%.
As the PFE (or VaR) limits increase we see that the implied price of risk per
extra unit of volatility decreases as we would expect. That is, wider limits imply
lower aversion to risk.
Shifted-Lognormal relative returns To assess the robustness of the prices
of risk in Figure 4 we now assume that the relative returns of the business unit
have a shifted Lognormal distribution. This provides a heavy-tailed distribution.
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Figure 4: Implied bank price of risk given budget (required rate or return) of
10% and quantile (PFE or VaR) limit using 95% and 99%. See text for details.
We pick −1 as the shift as this is essentially the worst case which we assume is
the business unit losing its investment. Since a shifted Lognormal distribution
has three parameters and we have fixed one of them we can solve for the other
two parameters. This involves a quadratic equation so there are two possible
solutions. We chose the lower of the two as the more reasonable, i.e. given a
low and a high implied price of risk it is more reasonable to conclude that the
bank as the lower price of risk. Of course, depending on circumstances (e.g.
observations of limits on other business units with Normal returns) it could be
reasonable to make the opposite conclusion. Hence:
σSLN =−
√
2erfc−1(2q)
±
√
2erfc−1(2q)2 − 2(log(Lµrequired − γ)− log(µrequired − γ)) (4)
µSLN = log(µrequired − γ)− (σSLN)
2
2
(5)
σ⇒ =
√(
eσ
2
SLN − 1) e2µSLN+σ2SLN (6)
mB =
µrequired − r
σ⇒
(7)
We use γ for the shift, giving the general result for a shifted Lognormal. Figure
5 shows a comparison of implied bank price of risk using two different rela-
tive return distributions. These have a maximum relative difference of 15%
at L = 12.5, thus we conclude that the implied bank price of risk is robust
against changes in the return specification between Normal and Unit-Shifted-
Lognormal.
It is clear from Figure 5, and from simple observation, that no finite PFE
(or VaR or ES) limit is compatible with a zero price of risk. By definition a zero
price of risk indicates indifference to anything except the expected return. This
implies that using any risk-neutral measure alone is incompatible with a finite
risk appetite.
Empirical relative returns There are two cases here: empirical distribution
fits the budget and PFE (or VaR) constraints; empirical distribution does not
fit the constraints. If the empirical distribution fits the constraints all that is
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Figure 5: Comparison of implied bank price of risk using two different relative
return distributions: Normal and Unit-Shifted-Lognormal
required is to compute the standard deviation of the relative returns which is
trivial. If the empirical distribution does not fit then we shift and scale it so
that it does fit as follows.
Let the ordered, from smallest to largest, relative returns be xi, i = 1, . . . , n
and
nq =dn× qe (8)
µrequired =g
n∑
i=1
(xi + h) (9)
PFE(q) = Lµrequired =g(xnq + h) (10)
So again we have two equations in two unknowns and can solve for the shift h
and scale g. Hence
h =
xnq − L
∑n
i=1 xi
Ln− 1 (11)
g =
Lµ
xnq + h
(12)
The problem is now reduced to the empirical distribution case which fits the
constraints. That is we simply calculate the empirical standard deviation for
σ⇒. This can then be used to give the bank price of risk.
Whether or not it makes sense to scale and shift the empirical distribution
will depend on the individual circumstances. Here we provide the procedure in
case it is reasonable.
2.3 The Risk Appetite Measure, A for PFE
Just as a P-measure is defined as a change in the drift from a risk-neutral
measure given by the market price of risk, we define the Risk Appetite Measure,
A, as a change in the drift from a risk-neutral measure given by the bank price
of risk, i.e.
µA := mBσ + r
This is used in conjunction with the T-Forward measure to provide a unique
Risk Appetite Measure for PFE. Specifically we compute the discounted PFE (or
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VaR, or other limit), which is measure-independent, and then apply an inverse
discount given by zero coupon bond prices assuming that the rate of return
is µA. This procedure explicitly obeys the Independence Principle described
above and implicitly makes use of the T-Forward measure. However, note that
the procedure permits computation of the discounted PFE (or VaR) under any
measure. Thus there is no added complexity for computation.
3 Discussion and Conclusions
Here we propose using the bank’s own risk appetite to set the measure for
risk limits, e.g. PFE, provided that the bank’s risk appetite is consistent with
regulatory, or general limit maintenance, backtesting. If the bank’s risk appetite
is not consistent with regulatory backtesting this suggests that the bank’s risk
appetite should be modified in order to pass the regulatory Use Test for day-to-
day business decisions and satisfy the principles of a consistent Risk Appetite
Framework (BCBS-328 2015; FSB 2013). We note that a zero price of risk is
inconsistent with a finite risk appetite, and this suggests that measures for PFE
cannot be risk neutral.
We call this measure defined by the bank’s own risk appetite the Bank
Risk Appetite Measure or A. We provide a measure-independent procedure for
computing PFE under A. A is defined by the bank price of risk and we give three
methods for computing it based on business unit budgets and limits. This data
is readily available and business unit heads are acutely aware of their progress
against plan on budget and limit usage.
This paper adds to the literature by further linking investment valuation and
evaluation (Markowitz 1952; Sharpe 1964) and mathematical finance by propos-
ing that limits be computed under the bank’s risk appetite measure provided
as part of sound, and self-consistent, governance.
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